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Abstract  
In this study, for BRICS countries and Turkey defense spending 
economic development and income distribution relationship is examined 
for the period 1995-2015. High defense expenditures are on the agenda 
as an important research topic in the world and in our country. Therefore, 
the effects of defense expenditures on income distribution and economic 
development of countries can be determined by examining these three 
variables. For the BRICS countries and Turkey, to examining the impact 
of defense spending and income distribution to economic development 
too much work not found. Westerlund (2008) found that the cointegration 
relationship between the main variables and the negative components 
was not detected in the long term, whereas long-term relationship was 
found between the positive components.  
According to the results of the asymmetric panel causality 
analysis, only one-way causality from economic growth to defense 
expenditures was determined between economic growth and defense 
expenditures in the period 1995-2010, while there was no causality from 
defense expenditures to economic growth. One-way causality from 
income inequality to defense expenditures was identified between 1995 
and 2010 in terms of income inequality and defense expenditures, while 
bi-directional causality was detected in 1996-2011 period. In the period 
of 2000-2015, it is concluded that there is a one-way causality from 
defense expenditures to income inequality. 
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Introduction 
At the end of the 19th century, Adolph Wagner expressed an 
opinion known as Wagner's Law that public expenditures would increase 
over time. According to this law, as the per capita income increases, the 
share of the public in the economy also increases. Although this law does 
not find enough support in the later periods, the share of public 
expenditures in the developed countries in income is supported by the 
data that have a higher share compared to the underdeveloped countries. 
While the share of central governments in developed countries is 32%, 
this rate is 17% in low-income countries (Baer and Galvao, 2008, 
Dişbudak, 2017: 2).       
According to the Wagner's Law, the causality relationship will be 
directed from economic growth to public expenditures, and the increase 
in public expenditures with increasing prosperity due to economic growth 
will result in the increase in public expenditures together with the 
increase in total public expenditures. The Keynes hypothesis is that the 
increase in public spending will bring economic growth along with the 
direction of causality between public spending and economic growth; it 
is stated that it is towards the direction of economic growth from public 
expenditures (Şanlısoy, Sunal, 2016: 103).      
Many factors such as budget deficits, inflation level, economic 
crises, level of technological progress, globalization of the world 
economy, education level of the country's labor force and population, 
social rules, distribution of labor force, privatizations are listed. 
Nowadays, it is also wondered whether the increase in the amounts 
allocated to the arms of their countries from their budgets will create 
income inequality. While countries are making defense expenditures, 
they allocate budget for defense expenditures by choosing between 
education, health and social transfer expenditures and defense budgets 
(Taş, et al., 2013: 669). The studies on defense expenditures and income 
distribution are based on the studies of Taş et al., 2013, Aksoğan, 
Elveren, 2012.        
This study consists of three parts. In the first part, the relationship 
between defense expenditures and income inequality, and the second 
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part, the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is 
discussed. In the third section, horizontal section dependence, 
homogeneity tests, Hadri and Kuruzomi panel unit root test, Hatemi-J 
(2012) panel cointegration and panel asymmetric causality tests are 
performed by using econometric analysis. The contribution of the 
importance of the study and the literature has to offer, military spending, 
economic development and income inequality in relation, for the 1995-
2015 period, the BRICS countries and Turkey that investigated using 
current data and Hatami-J (2012), the panel reserved cointegration and 
panel examined by asymmetric causality tests It is the first study in the 
literature.       
Relationship Between Defense Spending and Income 
Inequality 
The relationship between defense spending and income 
inequality, which is basically explained by four different approaches (Lin 
ve Ali, 2009, s.673, Töngür, Elveren, 2012: 4, 5, Dixon ve Moon 1986,  
Dunne 2000; Yıldırım ve Sezgin Taşıran, 2002, Elveren, 2017):                
The first is based on the Traditional Keynesian Approach. 
According to this approach, defense spending increases the total demand 
and employment opportunities by stimulating effective demand in 
defense-related sectors. Increased income inequality during the recession 
period of the economy has improved in the period of development. The 
increasing demand for defense spending increases the economic 
development. Economic development will affect low-income groups 
more and will have a reducing effect on income inequality (Beach, 1977, 
p.56). 
The second is explained within the framework of basic 
microeconomic theory. The fact that the defense sector provides 
employment for higher wage labor force compared to other sectors will 
have an expansion in this area in general, which will increase the inter-
sectoral wage inequality (Ali, 2007, p.520).       
Thirdly, total defense expenditures consist of personnel, 
equipment, research and development, and operational expenses. Each of 
these expenditure items has an effect on inequality. For example, military 
personnel expenditures in the defense industry are directed towards a less 
qualified labor force group and more qualified labor force is employed 
for R & D activities. Expenditure on military personnel will reduce 
inequality, while higher R & D expenditure will lead to a further wage 
gap between qualified and unskilled labor (Lin and Ali, 2009, p.674). 
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Fourth, the main purpose of the welfare and social states is to 
redistribute income in order to allow for a more equitable income 
distribution. One of the most basic tools used to redistribute revenue is 
transfer expenditures. In this respect, high defense spending creates a 
burden on the budget and decreases transfer expenditures. There is a 
trade-off relationship between the budget expenditure items. The size of 
the budget allocated for defense causes a lower budget to be allocated to 
income distribution and a lower budget for education, health and social 
transfer expenditures (Taş, et al., 2013: 669, 670).    
The size of defense spending and the factors affecting these 
expenditures in developed and developing countries are reported to have 
structural differences. It can be concluded that the defense spending level 
could not be explained by economic factors in developed countries, 
which have established the defense industry and which can produce and 
sale the weapon. In developing countries, defense expenditures are 
directly proportional to income levels. Most of these countries are 
dependent on the countries producing weapons for their defense needs 
since they cannot establish their own defense industries. The common 
result obtained from these studies is that countries will not be able to give 
up their defense expenses as long as the borders between the countries 
and the free and independent living will continue (Erbaykal, 2007: 5).     
The relationship between military expenditure and income 
inequality is described in the context of three causal relationships (Lin 
and Ali 2009, Elveren 2012, Rufael 2016): i) inequality reduction, ii) 
inequality enhancer, and iii) is expressed by the neutrality hypothesis 
(Caruso, Biscione, 2017: 3 ):         
Hypothesis That Narrows Inequality  
Higher military spending may lead to higher aggregate demand 
growth and increased employment. If the military industries are labor 
intensive and defense productions are indigenous, there may be an 
employment-enhancing effect in the whole economy. Economic growth 
generates benefits for the poor population in terms of income and allows 
for the improvement of income distribution (Hirnissa et al 2009; Lin and 
Ali 2009; Elveren 2012, Biscione, 2017: 3). 
 
 
Hypothesis Expanding Inequality 
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This hypothesis is based on the idea that military industries prefer 
the productive workforce with higher wages than the less skilled workers 
in the civil sector, and military spending may have an increasing impact 
on inter-sectoral wage differences (Ali, 2007, Biscione, 2017: 3).  
Impartiality Hypothesis 
According to the neutrality hypothesis, the impact of military 
expenditures on income inequality is considered unimportant for two 
reasons; i) defense expenditure refers to a small portion of total 
government expenditures. ii) The labor force employed in the military 
industry sector is the amount of labor that can be ignored within the total 
labor force. 
Demiryürek Ürper, (2018: 1), as stated by the redistributive effect 
of public expenditures varies according to the type of expenditure. 
Benefits such as defense and justice, which cannot be measured and 
divided, are generally not affected by redistribution. No definite 
interpretation can be made about the effects of public services such as 
defense and justice on the distribution of income because they cannot be 
measured and divided. Since these services are presented to the society as 
a whole, its effect on income distribution is considered to be neutral 
(Tuncer, 1970: 60, Demiryürek Ürper, 2018: 32). Public expenditures 
such as defense expenses do not have income distributive features (Eker, 
2005: 292, Ürper Demiryürek, 2018: 46). 
In the theoretical framework, there are many ways to integrate 
defense expenditure and income inequality (Hirnissa et al., 2009: 96): 
1) It will have an equalizing effect on a possible increase in defense 
spending and will have a reducing effect on public expenditures for 
social programs such as health, education and so on. 
2) Taxes on support of military expenditures may be disproportionately 
reduced for the middle class and the risk of post-tax income 
inequality may be eliminated. 
3) The high level of military expenditures and the use of violence 
against trade unions as a control tool are seen as an area where higher 
military spending should be sacrificed in the social context. 
4) The army receives low-skilled labor from the market, and this may 
lead to an increase in wages for young and unskilled labor. As the 
equipment intensive defense spending increases, the effects that 
increase the inequality inequality are dominant. As labor and labor-
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intensive soldiers produce and military production increases, 
inequality in income inequality data can be seen. 
5) If there is good governance, the cointegration relationship can be 
eliminated. If government policies and budgets are carefully carried 
out, the share of defense expenditures allocated from the budget will 
not have to be used for other public expenditures such as education 
and health.  
 
 
Figure 1. Opportunity Cost Burden Effect 
Source: Vadlamannati, 2008: 3.  
The literature on the relationship between military expenditure and 
income inequality is very limited (Abell 1994; Seiglie 1997; Ali 2007; 
2012; Vadlamannati 2008; Hirnissa et. ve diğerleri 2009; Lin ve Ali 
2009; Elveren 2012; Kentor vd. 2012, Töngür, Elveren, 2012: 5). Ali 
(2002) investigated the effect of income distribution injustice with the 
help of Theil statistics. As a result of the study, countries with more 
equitable income distribution have concluded that they have less defense 
spending (Destek, 2014. 30, 31). Taş et al. (2013), for the period of 1970-
2008, defense spending in Turkey, income inequality is examined the 
relationship between growth. Using VAR model and causality analysis, a 
one-way causality from defense spending to income inequality has been 
identified. Within the framework of the VAR model, defense spending 
shows that it is very strong in explaining income inequality. Aksoğan, 
Elveren (2012), aims to contribute to the literature by using cointegration 
and causality methods for the period of 1970-2008 and examining more 
variables. According to this study, growth and social transfers, defense 
spending, while the healing effect on income inequality in Turkey is 
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increasing inequality. Destek (2014), panel data regression method and 
panel cointegration tests, the effects of defense expenditures on growth 
and the factors determining defense expenditures are examined. 
According to the findings, defense expenditures positively affect the 
economy in all country groups in a negative way with the level of 
development of countries. In addition, it was concluded that other public 
expenditures were more efficient than defense expenditures. Caruso, 
Biscione (2017), for the period 1990-2015, examines the relationship 
between military spending and income injustice for European countries 
and concludes that there is a positive relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality. Shahbaz et al. (2015) examined the 
period 1971-2011 for Iran. The results of the analysis suggest that 
defense expenditures have a positive effect on income distribution in Iran 
and economic growth leads to income inequality in defending 
expenditures according to the granger causality analysis, while 
decreasing income inequality and defining an inverse U form between 
defense expenditures and income inequality. Töngür and Elveren (2012) 
has been examined for 37 countries for the period of 1988-2003. It is 
stated that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and 
the central government budget share of military expenditures, and that 
terrorist incidents are an important factor affecting both the level of 
military spending and the level of inequality. Tongür and Elveren (2013), 
for the 1963-2008 period, analyzed for Turkey. According to the results 
of the analysis, it can be concluded that, although income inequality has a 
positive effect on economic growth, military expenditures do not have a 
significant effect. Ali and Galbraith (2003), was examined for the period 
1987-1997 and we have obtained consistent estimates that military 
spending has a positive effect on wage inequality. Given the close 
relationship between wage and income, the decrease in military spending 
of a country as a result shows that it can reduce income inequality. 
Vadlamannati (2008) examined the four major South Asian economies 
by using panel regression constant impact analysis of 1975-2005 and 
found that there was a direct relationship between wartime military 
spending and income inequality; It is suggested that the decrease in 
military expenditures for South Asia could reduce income inequality and 
lead to economic growth. Ali (2011) examined the period of 1987-2005 
for MENA countries and stated that military expenditures had a strong 
and negative effect on inequality, and that the increase in military 
expenditures in MENA countries decreased the level of inequality and 
also inequality and income per capita It is concluded that it affects the 
level of military spending. Anoruo, Sawhney, Murthy (2018), 1960-2012 
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period are examined with DOLS technique for the USA and it is stated 
that the change in per capita income creates a decrease in income 
inequality and the increase in military expenditures increase income 
inequality. It also shows that policy makers need to consider military 
spending in developing policies to reduce income inequality.  
Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
One of the criteria of development and prosperity is the 
distribution of income. The higher the national income per capita of a 
country, the more the country's annual national income is not shared in a 
balanced and equitable manner between individuals and production 
factors, the social, political and economic balance of countries cannot be 
mentioned seriously. Injustice in the distribution of income is not only 
presented as an economic problem but it is also expressed as a socio-
economic event that can affect the welfare levels of the citizens living in 
that country as a whole (Veil et al., 2016: 137). 
There is an unequal distribution in income distribution arising 
from regional income level differences as well as qualifications and 
education levels of employees (Kanberoğlu, Oğuz, 2016: 397).  
Figure 2. Kuznet’s Curve 
Source: Weil, 2016: 389, Çakmak, Tosun, 2017: 34.  
In the economics literature, the distribution of the total incomes 
produced in a certain period in a country among individuals, groups or 
production factors is called as income distribution. When income 
distribution types are listed as functional, personal, sectoral and regional 
income distribution. The level of education (primary, secondary and 
higher education) by professional groups (engineer teacher, doctor, 
lawyer, administrator, etc.), according to social groups (wage-salary, 
 International Journal of Contemporary Economics and  
Administrative Sciences 
ISSN: 1925 – 4423  
Volume :9, Issue: 1, Year:2019, pp. 1-24 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3262188 
9 
 
retired, trades, traders, entrepreneurs, etc.) and according to gender 
income distribution (Üzümcü, Korkat, 2014: 137).                 
In the literature, Kuznets hypothesis refers to the relationship 
between growth and income distribution. The Kuznets hypothesis (1995) 
is also known as the inverse U relation (Kanberoğlu, Arvas, 2014: 107). 
According to the hypothesis, in the underdeveloped countries, a small 
number of people in the economy benefit from this income distribution, 
with the transition from agriculture to the industrial economy at the 
beginning of growth and the use of new technologies. In the development 
period, the increase in growth is shared more fairly with the widespread 
use of new production methods. According to the Kuznets curve, growth 
initially leads to inequality distribution in income distribution, then 
income distribution increases in the following periods and income 
inequality decreases according to the initial level (Töngür, Elveren, 2016: 
4). In short, in the early stages of growth, wealth is divided in the final 
stages of poverty (Salvato et al., 2006, Karhan, Güdelci, 2017: 2143). 
The economic growth performance of the countries and the unfair 
distribution of income distribution are the determinants of the economic 
policies of the countries. The inequality in income distribution, together 
with the economic growth performance of countries, has a large share in 
determining the economic policies. 
Theoretical discussion in relation to the distribution of income 
and economic growth is explained in two ways; classical and political 
economy approach. The first approach suggests that the savings rate will 
increase with the increase in wealth so that the inequality increases the 
incomes of the rich population and that inequality promotes capital 
accumulation and economic growth, whereas the inequality increases in 
the inequality by increasing the inequality to express. These policies also 
adversely affect physical and human capital accumulation and ultimately 
increase economic growth (Delbianco et al., 2014: 384). 
There are different channels in which inequality in income 
distribution affects growth. Kaldor (1957) argued that a higher inequality 
would lead to higher savings, capital accumulation and growth, arguing 
that the marginal tendency of the rich to save is higher than that of the 
poor. In contrast, Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alsenia and Rodrick 
(1994) emphasize four channels in which income inequality has reduced 
growth rates (Tabassum, Majeed, 2008: 733). Second, unequal societies 
have more difficulty in actions that require collective action. This 
situation leads to more uncertainty about possible political instability and 
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tendencies and policies for populist re-income distribution policies. 
Third, in a more unequal society, voters support a lower income and 
higher inefficient tax burden. Fourth, credit markets are defective and 
income and wealth distribution is not fair, but low-income individuals are 
likely to invest in their human and physical capital, resulting in a long-
term negative growth. 
To explain the relationship between income distribution and 
economic growth; 
Sheikh et al. (2017), 1972-2016 period for Pakistan with GMM 
method are examined. According to the results of the analysis, it is 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between military 
expenditures and growth and inequality has a negative relationship with 
growth. Topuz, Dağdemir (2016) divided the countries between 1995 and 
2011 into four different groups according to their level of development, 
including low- and low-middle-income countries, upper-middle-income 
countries, high-income countries and all countries. The validity of the U 
hypothesis is tested. Economic growth and income inequality have 
increased in low- and low-middle-income countries and upper-middle-
income countries; It is concluded that economic growth and income 
inequality are reduced in high-income countries. Çakmak, Tosun (2017), 
2002-2013 period for 25 countries by examining the validity of the 
reverse U hypothesis was tested with panel data analysis. According to 
the results of the analysis, unlike the kuznets hypothesis, there is a U-
shaped relationship between economic growth and income distribution, 
as income per capita increases, income inequality decreases; after a 
certain turning point increases. A situation where the concept of social 
state is ignored and injustice prevention instruments in income 
distribution weakens. Şahin (2018) was examined by Dumiterschu-
Hurlin analysis of 15 developed countries for the period 1995-2014. It is 
concluded that there is no causal relationship between economic growth, 
commercial openness and income inequality. Erkal et al. (2015) was 
analyzed by panel data analysis for 11 countries between 1998 and 2010, 
and it is concluded that the increase in income inequality and poverty 
lead to growth according to the results of the analysis. Akıncı and Akıncı 
(2016), for the 1960-2014 period Turkey, Enders-Siklos cointegration 
analysis and TAR and M-TAR analysis and examined and variables 
according to the analysis results in the long term also associated and that 
the Toda-Yamamoto causality analysis based on the results reverse in 
Turkey It can be said that the U hypothesis is valid. Ak, Altintas (2016), 
for the 1986-2012 period, of Turkey, in the period examined by the 
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ARDL approach to the inverse relationship instead of relationship 
decreased applies where that economic growth in the previously 
increasing per capita income inequality in income distribution and then 
deteriorated again. Tabassum, Majeed (2008), 1965-2003 period was 
examined for 69 developing countries. There is a strong negative 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. In the 
short term, the relationship between growth and income inequality may 
be positive, but over time, income inequality decreases economic growth. 
Delbianco et al. (2014), 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries for 
the period of 1980-2010, and the income distribution and economic 
growth in relation to the income level are emphasized. It is concluded 
that inequality is detrimental to economic growth and that income 
distribution in richer countries encourages growth in high inequality, and 
that redistribution policy for poor population supports economic growth 
in low-income economies. Meng, Lucyshyn, Li (2013), 1989-2012 
period is examined by China for cointegration and causality analysis and 
it can be concluded that China's military expenditures have an effect on 
inequality in income distribution.  
Methodology and Findings 
 In this study, we examined the  period of 1995-2015 for the 
BRICS countries and Turkey, income distribution, economic 
development and military expenditure within the framework of the 
relationship; LM (Breusch & Pagan 1980), CDlm (Pesaran 2004), CD 
(Pesaran 2004), LMadj cross-sectional dependency tests, and 
homogeneity tests, Hadri and Kuruzomi (2012) unit root test, Hatemi-J 
(2012) panel-hidden cointegration test and panel asymmetric causality 
test, Milex (GDP), HDI (Human Development Index) and Income 
Distribution data. Milex data and income distribution data (World Bank 
Data) and HDI (UNDP-Human Development Reports) are compiled from 
databases. In this study, Gauss 14.0 and Eviews 10.0 programs were 
analyzed.       
 Which econometric analysis will be performed in the study can 
affect the reliability of the analyzes. In this context, first of all, the cross-
sectional dependence and homogeneity of the models will be examined. 
Horizontal analysis of the results of the cross-sectional analysis in the 
analysis of CD Pesaran (2004) analysis (Giniit= a0+β1Milexit+ei and 
Hdinit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei) except for all models in the horizontal H the 
ayes have it. In this context, second generation analyzes should be used 
in the models considering the assumption of cross-sectional dependence. 
The H:0 hypothesis that the models are homogeneous for the 
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homogeneity test has been rejected and it has been accepted that the 
models show heterogeneity.          
Table 1. Horizontal Cross-Section Dependence Test Results 
Homogeneity Test 
 Delta Tilde Delta Tildeadj 
Stat. Prb. Stat. Prb. 
Basic 
Variables 
Hdiit= a0+β1Milexit+ei 4.512 0.000a 4.855 0.000a 
Giniit= a0+β1Milexit+ei 3.719 0.000a 4.002 0.000a 
Positive 
Variables 
Hdipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 18.67 0.000a 20.02 0.000a 
Ginipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 18.52 0.000a 19.93 0.000a 
Negative 
Variables 
Hdinit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei 12.64 0.000a 13.60 0.000a 
Gininit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei 17.97 0.000a 19.34 0.000a 
Note: a sequence shows that the models contain horizontal cross-sectional 
dependencies and that the models are heterogeneous. 
Stability of the variables used in the study were examined by 
Hadri and Kuruzomi (2012), which take into account the cross-sectional 
dependence of second-generation unit root tests. Hadri and Kuruzomi 
(2012) test was developed as a panel version of KPSS unit root test 
which is one of the time series. 
Two types of test statistics are calculated for this test. These are 
the ZAspac ve  ZAla statistics. Both are assumed to have a normal 
distribution when they are close to infinity. Thus, even in cases where 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is weak, the counterfeit unit is a validation test that is being 
applied in order not to cause root. In addition, the hypothesis of this test 
is inverse and the basic hypothesis is that the variables do not have a unit 
root. In the case of p> 0.10, the basic hypothesis is assumed, that is, the 
unit is considered to be rootless. In the opposite case, if p <0.10, the 
variable is considered to be unit rooted.    
Data generation process is in a Y series as below;     
y+it =zt ‘δi +ƒtγi + ℮+i,t 
℮+i,t=θ℮+it-1+ vt 
 Model 
LM (Breusch & 
Pagan 1980) 
CDlm (Pesaran 
2004) 
CD (Pesaran 
2004) LMadj 
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Basic 
Variables 
Hdiit= a0+β1Milexit+ei 593.480 0.000a 18.712 0.000a 23.041 0.000a 22.679 0.000a 
Giniit= a0+β1Milexit+ei 355.556 0.000a 7.102 0.000a -0.904 0.183 27.446 0.000a 
Positive 
Variables 
Hdipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 436.831 0.000a 11.068 0.000a 16.519 0.000a 10.233 0.000a 
Ginipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 496.949 0.000a 14.002 0.000a 1.590 0.056c 43.500 0.000a 
Negative 
Variables 
Hdinit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei 309.173 0.000a 4.839 0.000a 0.157 0.438 16.611 0.000a 
Gininit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei 340.685 0.000a 6.377 0.000a 4.640 0.000a 28.272 0.000a 
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y-it =zt ‘δi +ƒtγi + ℮-i,t 
℮-i,t=θ℮-it-1+ vt    is calculated as. 
 
Table 2. Hadri ve Kuruzomi Stationary Test Result 
 I(0) I(1) 
ZAspac Prob. ZAla Prob. ZAspac Prob. ZAla Prob. 
Hdi 0.1498 0.4404a 1.3801 0.038 -1.3481 0.9112a -1.2194 0.8886a 
Hdip 2.6272 0.004 0.1183 0.4529a -0.1135 0.5452a 37.02 0.3556a 
Hdin 35.404 0.000 40.938 0.000 -2.7392 0.003 1.243 0.1068a 
Milex -1.485 0.931a -1.225 0.889a - - - - 
Milexp -1.753 0.960a -0.027 0.5108a - - - - 
Milexn -1.026 0.847a -1.422 0.922a - - - - 
Gini 9.8432 0.000 16.952 0.000 -0.537 0.704a -0.283 0.611a 
Ginip 13.658 0.000 24.587 0.000 0.604 0.272a 0.546 0.292a 
Ginin 1.364 0.0862a -1.858 0.9684a -1.452 0.073a 0.110 0.4562a 
According to Hadri and Kuruzomi (2012) static test results, 
except the milex variable, the other two variables were unit rooted at the 
basic level and became static in the first difference situation. To examine 
the long-term relationship between variables, Westerlund (2008) Durbin-
H co-integration test, which takes into account the cross-sectional 
dependence, was used. The important point in this test is that the 
dependent variable has a unit value at the level value and it is not 
important that the stationary levels of the independent variables are I (0) 
or I (1). On the other hand, there are two statistics, Dhg and Dhp. Dhg 
statistics are used in the case of heterogeneity and Dhp statistics are used 
in homogeneity status. (Westerlund, 2008). 
Hatemi-J (2011) econometric structure of the hidden cointegration 
analysis can be explained as follows.      
First, the negative and positive components for each panel are as follows; 
℮+i1,t = max (℮i1,t,0) 
℮+i2,t = max (℮i2,t,0) 
℮-i1,t = min (℮i1,t,0) 
℮-i2,t = min (℮i2,t,0) 
In the light of this information, the yit ve xit equations of positive 
and negative components can be arranged and expressed as follows:      
y+i,t = y+i,0 + ℮+i1,t = y+i,0 +∑ ℮+i1,j 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1  
x+i,t = x+i,0 + ℮+i2,t = x+i,0 +∑ ℮+i2,j 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1  
y-i,t = y-i,0 + ℮+i1,t = y-i,0 +∑ ℮i1,j 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1  
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x-i,t = x-i,0 + ℮+i2,t = x-i,0 +∑ ℮+i2,j 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1  
Assuming that the independent variable is y, the positive and 
negative panel cointegration equivalence is calculated as follows:     
y+i,t = ∝1+ + βi+ x+i,t + ℮+i1,t 
y-i,t = ∝1- + βi- x-i,t +  + ℮-i1,t 
In the light of this information, the operation of the test first starts 
with the separation of the positive and negative shocks of the panel into 
two parts. In the next step, the shredded shocks of Westerlund (2008) 
Durbin-H cointegration test were applied. Thus, it can be determined 
whether there is a cointegration relationship between both positive and 
negative shocks in the panels. The strongest aspect of this method is that 
there is a relationship between positive and negative components, 
although there is no relationship between the basic components.      
Table 3. Durbin –H Cointegration Test 
 Models DHg Prob DHp Prob 
Basic Variables Hdiit= a0+β1Milexit+ei -0.296 0.383 -0.662 0.254 
Giniit= a0+β1Milexit+ei 0.770 0.779 -0.597 0.275 
Positive 
Variables 
Hdipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 1.379 0.016b 0.880 0.011b 
Ginipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei -1.428 0.077c -1.172 0.121 
Negative 
Variables 
Hdinit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei 23.938 0.999 14.173 0.999 
Gininit= a0+β1Milexnit+ei -0.417 0.338 1.301 0.903 
Note: b and c refer to cointegration at the significance level of 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
According to the Westerlund (2008) Durbin-H cointegration test 
results, the cointegration relationship between the main variables and the 
negative components, ie the long-term relationship was not detected, but 
the long-term relationship between the positive components was 
determined. As a result of the cointegration analysis, the long-term 
correlation between the positive variables was estimated only by the 
long-term coefficients between the positive variables. The estimation of 
the AMG (Augmented Mean Group Estimator), which was developed by 
Eberhardt and Bond (2009) and which considers the cross-sectional 
dependence, was estimated. The AMG estimates the long-term co-
integration coefficient, which will apply to the overall panel, by 
weighting the arithmetic mean of the long-term cointegration coefficients 
of the horizontal cross-sections (countries). In this respect, it gives more 
reliable results than CCE (Common Corelated Effects) estimator 
developed by Pesaran (2006). 
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Table 4. AMG Estimator Result 
 Hdipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei Ginipit= a0+β1Milexpit+ei 
Countries Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.  
Brazil 0.015 
(1.35) 
0.176 0.693 
(5.07) 
0.089c 
Russia 0.005 
(2.40) 
0.016b -2.115 
(-0.55) 
0.008a 
China 0.013 
(0.89) 
0.373 -14.078 
(-1.42) 
0.155 
India -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.725 -7.987 
(-0.97) 
0.334 
South Africa -0.132 
(-5.25) 
0.000a 62.346 
(3.87) 
0.000a 
Turkey -0.006 
(1.79) 
0.074c 0.017 
(0.07) 
0.942 
Panel -0.172  
(-1.74) 
0.046b 6.248 
(0.55) 
0.085c 
Note: a, b, and c mean 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.      
According to the results of the AMG estimator, a one-unit 
increase in defense expenditure in the first model resulted in a decrease 
of 0.172 units in economic growth. When the first model examined in 
some countries the impact on economic growth of defense spending in 
Turkey and South Africa negatively, while this effect was positive way in 
Russia. This finding can be explained by Keynesian approach. According 
to the Keynesian approach, arms importing countries create various 
innovations and these innovations shift to other production areas and 
contribute to the economic growth of the country. In this context, the 
economy in Turkey and South Africa, which exports weapons of defense 
spending is negative, it is not surprising positively affect the economy of 
a country like Russia, which imported weapons. According to the results 
of the AMG estimator, in the second model, it was determined that an 
increase in the defense expenditures increased the gini coefficient, in 
other words income inequality increased 6,248 units. When the panel is 
examined across countries, defense spending for Brazil and South Africa 
increased income injustice and for Russia, income inequality was 
observed to decrease in a long period parallel to the increase in economic 
growth. Turkey, India and could not detect a relationship between the 
number of the gun for defense spending and China. 
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In this study, asymmetric causality relationship between positive 
components will be examined by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) analysis. 
The most important advantages of this method are; to give effective 
results in unbalanced data sets, both in the case of cross-sectional 
dependency and in case of no cross-sectional dependence, and to be able 
to produce results when the time dimension is larger than the unit size 
(Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012: 1457). In this test, the causality 
relationship between Y and X is analyzed using a linear model as 
follows. In the first step of the causality test, the following seemingly 
unrelated regression is calculated: 
𝑌𝑌1𝑡𝑡
+ = a1,1 +  �𝐵𝐵1,1,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +      � δ1,1,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     +  Ɛ1,1,𝑡𝑡+     
𝑌𝑌2𝑡𝑡
+ = a1,2 +  �𝐵𝐵1,2,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +     � δ1,2,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,2𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     + Ɛ1,2,𝑡𝑡+     
𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡+ = a1,N +  �𝐵𝐵1,𝑁𝑁,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +      � δ1,𝑁𝑁,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     +  Ɛ1,𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡+     
and 
𝑋𝑋1𝑡𝑡
+ = a2,1 + �𝐵𝐵2,1,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +      � δ2,1,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     +  Ɛ2,1,𝑡𝑡+     
𝑋𝑋2𝑡𝑡
+ = a2,2 + �𝐵𝐵2,2,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +      � δ2,2,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     +  Ɛ2,2,𝑡𝑡+     
𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡+ = a1,N +  �𝐵𝐵1,𝑁𝑁,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
   +      � δ1,𝑁𝑁,𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑗𝑗=1
     +  Ɛ1,𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡+     
It is the optimal delay length that can be selected using the Akaike 
or Schwarz information criteria. The error terms may be interrelated. 
Wald tests are used to examine the causality relationship.         
 
 
 Panel Asymmetric Causality Results 
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 According to the findings, only one-way causality from economic 
growth to defense expenditures was determined between 1995-2010 in 
economic growth and defense expenditures, no causality from defense 
spending to economic growth could be determined.     
 
Figure 3. One-way Causality from economic growth to defense 
expenditures 
 One-way causality from income inequality to defense 
expenditures was identified between 1995 and 2010 in terms of income 
inequality and defense expenditures, while bi-directional causality was 
detected in 1996-2011 period. In the period 2000-2015, a one-way 
causality from defense expenditures to income inequality has been 
identified.     
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Figure 4. One-way Causality income inequality to defense expenditures 
 
 Results and Discussion 
There are many factors affecting the income distribution of 
countries. In the literature, there is an ongoing debate on whether budget 
spending and defense spending in countries allocated for military 
spending will generate income inequality. The most fundamental feature 
of being a welfare state is to provide a fair income distribution. In this 
study, the 1995-2015 period, for the BRICS countries and Turkey are 
examined with Hatemi-J (2012) panel cointegration and asymmetric 
panel causality test. Stability of the variables used in the study were 
examined by Hadri and Kuruzomi (2012), which take into account the 
cross-sectional dependence of second-generation unit root tests. 
According to Hadri and Kuruzomi (2012) static test results, except for 
the milex (military expenditures) variable, the other two variables are 
unit rooted at the level and become stationary in the first difference 
situation. According to the results of the Durbin-H cointegration test 
Westerlund (2008), the cointegration relationship between the main 
variables and the negative components, in the long-term relationship was 
not detected, but the long-term relationship between the positive 
components was determined.      
As a result of the cointegration analysis, the long-term correlation 
between the positive variables was estimated only by the long-term 
coefficients between the positive variables. The estimation of the AMG 
(Augmented Mean Group Estimator), which was developed by Eberhardt 
and Bond (2009) and which considers the cross-sectional dependency, 
was estimated. According to the results of the AMG estimator, a one-unit 
increase in defense expenditure in the first model resulted in a decrease 
of 0.172 units in economic growth. 
When the first model in the country are examined on the basis, 
the impact on economic growth of defense spending in Turkey and South 
Africa negatively, while in Russia this effect is positive that this situation 
can be explained by way Keynesian approach. According to the results of 
the AMG estimator, in the second model, it was found that an increase in 
defense expenditures increased the income inequality by 6.248 units. 
When the panel is examined across countries, defense spending for Brazil 
and South Africa increased income injustice and for Russia, income 
inequality was observed to decrease in a long period parallel to the 
increase in economic growth. In Turkey, India and China could not be 
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identified a causal relationship between defense spending and number of 
gini coefficient.  
According to the results of the asymmetric panel causality 
analysis, only one-way causality from economic growth to defense 
expenditures was determined between economic growth and defense 
expenditures in the period 1995-2010, while there was no causality from 
defense expenditures to economic growth. One-way causality from 
income inequality to defense expenditures was identified between 1995 
and 2010 in terms of income inequality and defense expenditures, while 
bi-directional causality was detected in 1996-2011 period. In the period 
of 2000-2015, it is concluded that there is a one-way causality from 
defense expenditures to income inequality.      
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